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Summary 
This study empirically examines the relationships among major U.S. automakers and 
tire firms before World War II. Accordingly, it discusses the primary historical records 
of Ford Motor Company (Ford Motors) and Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company 
(Goodyear). Analysis reveals that organizational principles underlie and influence 
transactions related to tire sales between large automakers and tire firms. Underlying 
long-term negotiated contracts, however, market principles were also hard at work. This 
paper provides important historical sources that can be used for international 
comparative analysis of other interfirm relationships, analysis that can contribute factor 
findings in the area of business history. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, I empirically examine how vertically integrated big firms conducted 
transactions of intermediary products during an era characterised by the growth of 
modern large corporations in the United States. In particular, I analyse the tire 
transactions that occurred between big tire firms and automobile firms during 1900–
1940. 
According to Alfred Chandler Jr.,1  who has significantly contributed to business 
history research, successful big enterprises were vertically integrated in this era in the 
                                                 
1 Chandler, 1977. 
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United States. However, at the time, even big assembly firms could not integrate the 
production of all the required parts and materials, and large proportions of intermediary 
products were produced by ‘specialized’ suppliers. Moreover, sometimes, major 
assemblers tended to rapidly increase the number of parts to be purchased from 
suppliers rather than performing in-house production. For example, big U.S. automobile 
companies stopped the in-house production of many parts and started buying them in 
the early 1920s (Kim, 2013; Murray and Schwartz, 2019). 
Furthermore, an oligopolistic structure was established in many intermediary, as well 
as consumer product industries. Hence, it is highly likely that the volume of transactions 
regarding intermediary products among large oligopolistic firms expanded rapidly and 
the interfirm relationships among these firms became very important. 
Nevertheless, very few historical studies, particularly, those on business history, have 
examined the interfirm relationships among oligopolistic customers and suppliers in the 
intermediary industries of the U.S.. Accordingly, I examine the interfirm relationships 
that existed between big U.S. automobile firms and tire firms during 1900–1940, when 
both industries were leading the United States’ manufacturing sectors, which were 
oligopolistic in nature. For example, Goodyear and Firestone occupied the 11th and 16th 
positions, respectively, in the list of domestic firms with the largest number of 
employees among all U.S. industrial companies in 1957.2 Although extensive research 
has been conducted on the history of the U.S. tire industry and tire firms, none of them 
focuses on interfirm relationships in tire transactions.  
Tire products are categorized into two types: Original equipment (OE) and Renewal 
(RE) tires. The former type refers to tire products that are assembled in new cars, 
whereas the latter type refers to tires that are used to replace old ones. This paper 
discusses OE tire transactions alone as only these tires are transacted between tire and 
automobile firms. 
The objective of this paper is to clarify how the market and organizational principles 
worked in tandem to promote tire transactions among U.S. firms and intertwined each 
other in interfirm transaction of U.S. tires during 1900–1940. Now, I define the 
concepts of the market and organizational principles that are used in this paper. I first 
choose two criteria to differentiate between the two principles: the method of allocation 
of resources, and the relationships among economic players (Table 1). 
                                                 
2 Chandler, 1977, 114; Fortune 500 list, Fortune, June 1958. 
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Table 1 – Definitions of the market and organizational principles 
Criteria Market Principle Organizational Principle 
Resource 
Distribution 
Index Price or Quasi-Price Direction or Control 
Degree of freedom 
of relocation 
Free 
Restriction on relocation 
(including barriers to entry 
and exit) 
Relationships 
among 
Economic 
Players 
Degree of 
competition 
Perfect competition Cooperation 
Interests Conflicts of interests Community of interests 
Distance in 
relationship 
Distant Close 
 
Further, the first criterion, on resource allocation methods, is divided into two sub-
criteria. One is the index to move resources, which is the price or quasi-price under the 
market principle, whereas it is direction or control under the organizational principle. 
The other sub-criterion is the degree of freedom of relocation. Whereas resources move 
freely under the market principle, the movement of resources is restricted, including 
barriers to entry and exit, under the organizational principle. 
The second criterion, regarding the relationships among economic players, is also 
divided into three sub-criteria: degree of competition, interests, and distance in 
relationship. Initially, the market principle works to ensure perfect competition among 
players, whereas the organizational principle represents the cooperation among players. 
Regarding players’ interests, the market principle appears as conflicts of interests. 
Contrastingly, the organizational principle refers to communities of interests. In 
addition, whereas the market principle works among players to make them distant to 
one another, the organizational principle functions among players to promote close 
relationships among them (Table 1). 
It is highly probable that organizational principle works in interfirm relationships, 
which are part of organizations’ behaviours. For example, OE tire transactions between 
both oligopolistic customers and suppliers involved significant organizational 
transactions so that, in such cases, the organizational principle strongly affected the 
transaction. Furthermore, if the organizations such as big enterprises in the U.S. 
strengthened their influence on the economy as emphasized by Chandler, the 
organizational aspect was probably strongly reflected in interfirm relationships 
including tire transactions. 
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On the other hand, since an interfirm relationship depends on many factors other than 
the firms themselves, no specific firm can control it completely. Consequently, many 
phenomena in interfirm relationships may not represent the organizational principle and, 
hence, they can be considered to represent the market principle. Therefore, it is highly 
likely that organizational and market principles were intertwined in interfirm 
relationships.  
However, the specific ways in which market and organizational principles were 
intertwined in interfirm relationships probably varied across industries, periods, and 
countries. Hence, the accumulation of empirical analyses on the history of interfirm 
relationships from the perspective of business history is crucial. Nevertheless, to the 
best of my knowledge, no historical study has examined this perspective on 
intermediary industries in the United States.  
In this paper, I use primary sources of information and data on Goodyear Tire and 
Rubber Co. obtained from Akron University, Ohio, and Benson Ford Research Center at 
Dearborn, Michigan, as well as secondary materials on the U.S. automobile and tire 
industries. The first half of this paper analyses the tire transactions that occurred 
between Ford and Firestone, whereas the second half focuses on the interfirm 
relationship between General Motors and US Rubber. 
 
1. Beginning of long-term transactions between Ford Motors and Firestone Tire  
In 1900, Harvey Samuel Firestone established Firestone Tire in Akron city. Originally, 
Firestone Tire sold final tire products that manufactured the semi-finished tire and parts 
of tires to be purchased from BF Goodrich, which was the first mover in the rubber tire 
market. 3  As Firestone was a late comer to the automobile tire market, until 1908, 
Firestone it delivered car tires to only a few automobile companies, such as Maxwell, 
White, and Peerless.4 Its market shares were relatively small.  
However, on hearing a rumour that Henry Ford, the founder of Ford Motors, was 
planning to mass-produce four-cylinder cars at 500 dollars, Firestone visited the 
Highland Park plant, Dearborn, to see Henry Ford and obtain an order for tires from the 
latter.5 In this visit, Firestone succeeded in entering into a transaction contract with Ford 
                                                 
3 Blackford and Kerr, 1996, 34; Lief, 1951b, 78; Love and Giffels, 1999, 17. 
4 Lief, 1951b, 26, 78, 85. 
5 Lief, 1951a, 28, 86, 100. 
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and obtained orders for 10,000 OE tire units for Ford T-model cars in 1906 and 
delivered 2,000 tire units by June 1906. After the first transaction agreement was signed 
between Ford and Firestone in 1906, the interfirm relationship between the two 
companies was maintained for several decades and became stronger over the years, as 
discussed later in this paper. 
 
2. Working of the organizational principle in the transaction between Ford Motors 
and Firestone Tire 
Many phenomena that represent the organizational principle can be observed in the 
transaction of OE tires between Ford and Firestone from the late 1900s to the 1930s. 
First, Ford and Firestone continued to transact between them in the form of long-term 
obligational contracts. This obligational contract relationship demonstrates the 
organizational principle. The details are as follows: Since 1906, the number of 
transactions between the firms tended to increase, although it occasionally declined in 
the short run. Even during economic depression, Firestone acquired an order of tires 
from Ford. For instance, during the recession in the early 1920s, to recover from their 
financial difficulties, Harvey Firestone invited Henry Ford to his mansion, named 
‘Harbel Manor’, and negotiated tire transactions with the latter. In spring 1921, Harvey 
Firestone paid a visit to the headquarters of Ford in Detroit and succeeded in obtaining 
new orders from Ford. 6  This transaction assisted Firestone’s recovery from a 
management crisis. Again, in 1930, Firestone sold 700,000 cases of tires to Ford 
regardless of the prevalence of economic depression. Furthermore, Firestone increased 
its sales to Ford more than twice in the late 1930s compared to those in the early 1930s.7 
 
Table 2 – Goodyear's tire sales to Ford and General Motors 
Period 
Tire Sales to 
Ford 
Period 
Tire Sales to 
General Motors 
1916–1917 730,041 
July 1, 1916–June 30, 
1917 
260,322 
1917–1918 656,165 
July 1, 1917–June 30, 
1918 
250,278 
1918–1919 487,802 
July 1, 1918–June 30, 
1919 
231,850 
Aug. 1, 1919–Sept. 635,226 July 1, 1919–June 30, 385,102 
                                                 
6 Lief, 1951a, 187; Lief, 1951b, 159. 
7 Blackford and Kerr, 1996, 59; Bobcock, 1966, 308. 
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20, 1920 1920 
1920–1921 933,720 
July 1, 1920–June 
30, 1921 
129,155 
Source: Internal document, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company Records, 1898-1933, 
Goodyear Archives, American History Research Center, University of Akron. 
 
Meanwhile, the firms’ dependency on each other in tire transactions showed an 
increasing trend. In 1906, Ford purchased 65 percent of their total tire requirements. In 
1912, the sales to Ford comprised more than 10 percent of Firestone’s total sales.8 
According to the contract document on tire transaction between Ford and Firestone 
drafted in January 22, 1916, Ford was required to buy from Firestone at least 40 percent 
of the amount of tire purchases. 9  Further, based on Table 2, from 1916 to 1921, 
Firestone’s sale of tires to Ford was three to seven times larger than its sale to General 
Motors, which was the second largest car maker during the period. 
According to Table 3, in 1924, Ford exclusively purchased car tires alone from 
Firestone, which demonstrates that Firestone and Ford considered each other to be 
important transaction parties. Further, during the late 1930s, Ford purchased more than 
20 percent of their requirement for tires from Firestone.10  
 
Table 3 – Tire suppliers of U.S. automobile firms in 1924 
Automobile 
Firms 
Suppliers of Tire=Tire 
Firms 
Automobile 
Firms 
Suppliers of Tire=Tire 
Firms 
Anderson Firestone Lafayette Goodyear 
Apperson Goodyear, Goodrich, 
Firestone 
Lincoln Goodyear, Firestone, 
Goodrich, US Rubber 
Auburn Goodyear, Goodrich Locomobile Goodyear, Goodrich, Fisk 
Barley Goodyear, Firestone, 
Goodrich 
Marmon Goodrich, Firestone 
Buick Goodyear, Goodrich, Ajax, 
Dunlop, US Rubber, 
Pennsylvania, Firestone 
Maxwell Fisk 
Cadillac Goodyear, Goodrich, US 
Rubber 
McFarlan Goodyear and standard 
makes 
Case Goodyear Moon Miller, Kelly 
Charlmers Fisk Nash Goodyear, Firestone 
Chandler Goodyear, Goodrich Oakland Goodyear, Firestone, Ajax 
                                                 
8 Lief, 1951a, 64. 
9 Internal document, Ford Motors Archives, Benson Ford Research Center; Lief, 1951b, 
145. 
10 Bobcock, 1966, 308. 
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Chevrolet Goodyear, Goodrich Olds Goodyear, Ajax, Kelly, 
Goodrich, Firestone 
Chrysler Fisk Overland Fisk 
Cleveland Goodyear, Oldfield Willys-
Knight 
Fisk 
Cole Firestone, Goodrich Packard Kelly, Miller, Firestone 
Columbia Fisk, Firestone Paige Goodyear, Firestone 
Cunningham Goodyear Peerless Goodyear, Firestone, US 
Rubber 
Davis Goodrich Pierce-
Arrow 
Goodyear, Goodrich, US 
Rubber, Firestone 
Dodge Goodyear, US Rubber, 
Ajax 
R & V 
Knight 
Goodrich, Firestone 
Dorris Goodyear, Goodrich Raugh & 
Lang 
Goodyear, Goodrich, Fisk 
Dort Miller REO US Rubber 
Duesenberg Goodyear, Goodrich, 
Firestone 
Rickenbacke
r 
Kelly, Seiberling 
Durant Fisk Roamer Goodyear, Goodrich, 
Firestone 
Elgin Goodrich Rollin Firestone 
Essex Kelly Rolls-Royce Goodyear, Dunlop, 
Goodrich 
Flint Fisk Sayers-
Scoville 
Goodyear, Goodrich 
Ford Goodyear, Firestone, 
Goodrich, Miller, Mason 
Stanley Goodyear, Goodrich 
Franklin Goodyear Star Fisk 
Gardner Goodyear Stearns Goodyear, Firestone, 
Goodrich 
Gray Goodrich Sterling 
Knight 
Goodrich, Firestone, 
Miller 
Hanson Goodyear Stevens-
Duryea 
Tires furnished as 
specified 
Haynes Goodyear, Seiberling Studebaker Goodyear, Firestone, US 
Rubber, Goodrich 
Hudson Kelly Stutz Goodrich 
Hupp Goodyear Velie Miller 
H.C.S Goodrich Westcott Firestone 
Jewett Oldfield, Miller Wills-St. 
Claire 
US Rubber, Firestone 
Jordan Goodyear, Firestone Willys-
Overland 
Tires furnished as 
specified 
Kissel Goodyear, Firestone - - 
Source: Internal document, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company Records, 1898–1933, 
Goodyear Archives, American History Research Center in University of Akron. 
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Second, the construction of a factory for a specific customer represents the working 
of the organizational principle. Specifically, when its dependency on Ford in terms of 
tire transactions increased and it started considering Ford an important customer, 
Firestone constructed a tire factory to ensure exclusive production to Ford. The new 
factory started its operations in 1917 and its products were exclusively delivered to Ford 
for the Ford T-Model. In this manner, the organizational principle was reflected in 
Firestone’s capital investment behaviour in its interfirm relationships with Ford. 
Third, the cooperation between Firestone and Ford in tire production represents the 
organizational principle. In 1936, the ‘rubber strike’ started in Akron as a protest against 
a plan created by Goodyear to reduce wages and increase the pace of production. The 
strike created problems in Firestone’s delivery of tires to Ford, and Ford and Firestone 
cooperated with each other to overcome these issues. For instance, at the time of Ford’s 
preparations to start in-house tire production, Firestone dispatched its tire production 
engineers to Ford to support the latter’s tire production. Consequently, in approximately 
two years, Ford’s in-house tire factory could manufacture half the firm’s requirement of 
tires and implement several innovations to significantly reduce manufacturing costs.11 
Similarly, Ford dispatched some engineers from its crude rubble plantation to assist 
Firestone in learning rubber fabric technologies. In addition, when Ford’s production of 
truck tires was stopped in the spring of 1941 due to the strike, Firestone increased its 
supply of tires to support Ford’s requirements.12 In this manner, whenever difficulties 
occurred in tire production, both the firms cooperated with each other to overcome these 
problems, which reflect the application of the organizational principle. 
Fourth, personal relationships and networks played an important role in the 
transactions between the two firms, which reflects the organizational principle, as well. 
For instance, William S. Knudsen who had formerly worked at Ford and had a close 
relationship with the top management of Firestone moved to the Division of Chevrolet 
of General Motors as the division manager. Consequently, although Firestone had 
previously established weak relationship with General Motors, it could increase its tire 
sales to Ford as a result of the aforementioned relocation of personnel.13 This personnel 
moving illustrates the organizational principle, as well. 
                                                 
11 Sorensen, 1956, 198-200; Schwartz, 2000, 75. 
12 Interview with E. F. Wait in 1954, 29. 
13 Lief, 1951b, 261. 
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3. Working of the market principle in transactions between Ford Motors and 
Firestone Tires 
There are many examples for the working of the market principle in transactions 
between Ford and Firestone. To begin with, Ford’s role as an important customer 
brought down the price of Firestone’s tires, which demonstrated the effect of the market 
principle. While negotiating on the first transaction between Ford and Firestone, 
Firestone emphasized product quality since he was confident about his own products. 
Contrarily, Henry Ford was interested in only the delivery price of tire14 because, prior 
to the negotiation, he had already checked the high quality of the tires manufactured by 
Firestone through several tests. After negotiation, the price of Firestone’s tire for the 
Ford N-Model car was set at 55 dollars per set, which was 15 dollars lower than the 
price of the clincher tire that was popular and patented at the time. 15  Since then, 
Firestone has repeatedly attempted to reduce the production cost of tires delivered to 
Ford.16 Consequently, in the 1910s, Firestone sold its tire to Ford at a much lower price 
than the tire price at which Goodyear and Goodrich supplied to Ford. 17  Despite 
continuing its good relationship with Ford, Ford requested Firestone to deliver tires at 
extremely reduced rates. Under the pressure exerted by customers on suppliers to reduce 
the transaction price, since the price affected resource allocation in Firestone, the severe 
request made by Ford represents the market principle 
Moreover, although Ford heavily depended on Firestone to meet their tire 
requirements, it mainly practiced the multi-sourcing policy in OE tire purchases during 
the pre-war period. During the 1900s and 1910s, Ford bought OE tires for its T-Model 
cars from Goodyear and Goodrich, as well as Firestone.18 The contract document signed 
by Ford and Goodrich in November 1914 specified that Ford should buy from Goodrich 
at least half of its monthly purchasing number of tires during the contract period.19 
According to Table 3, in 1924, Ford purchased tires from not only Firestone but also 
                                                 
14 Lief, 1951a, 28. 
15 Lief, 1951b, 87. 
16 Nelson, 1988, 23. 
17 Internal document, Ford Motor Archives, Benson Ford Research Center. 
18 Allen, 1949, 315; Litchfield, 1954, 100. 
19 Internal document, Ford Motor Archives, Benson Ford Research Center. 
  10 
Goodyear, Goodrich, Miller, and Mason. Further, Table 4 reveals that Ford purchased a 
substantial number of tires from Goodyear in 1926. Despite high dependency on 
Firestone in purchasing tires, Ford used the competition among big tire firms by the 
multi-sourcing policy of tires, on the other hand. This competition represents the market 
principle.  
 
Table 4 – Purchase of tires by automobile firms from Goodyear and various other tire 
makers in 1926 
Automobile 
firms 
Suppliers of tires and 
Goodyear’s share in the total 
numbers of tires purchased by 
each automobile firm 
Automobile 
firms 
Suppliers of tires and 
Goodyear’s share in the total 
numbers of tire purchased 
by each automobile firm 
Auburn 60 percent (Goodrich 20 
percent, Firestone 20 percent) 
Lincoln 40 percent 
Buick 30–60 percent Moon 0 percent (Miller and 
Firestone 100 percent) 
Cadillac 60 percent Nash 50 percent 
Case 100 percent Marmon 0 percent (Goodrich, 
Firestone, and Seiberling 
had considerable shares) 
Chandler 50 percent (Goodrich 50 
percent) 
Oakland Low percent 
Chevrolet 50 percent Olds Low percent (Pennsylvania 
and Kelly had substantial 
shares) 
Chrysler 0 percent (Fisk 100 percent) Packard 0 percent (US Rubber, 
Seiberling, Firestone, Kelly, 
Miller) 
Cleveland Most of the exported cars 
purchased tires from 
Goodyear 
Paige Jewett 40 percent of total purchase 
by Paige(residuals are made 
by Firestone and Miller) 
Dodge Approximately 40 percent Peerless 40 percent (Goodrich and 
Firestone) 
Durant 0 percent (Fisk 100 percent) Pierce-Arrow 40 percent 
Elgar 0 percent (Firestone 100 
percent) 
REO 0 percent (US Rubber, 
Firestone, Kelly) 
Ford High proportion. U.S. west 
coast automobile factory 100 
percent 
Rickenbacker 100 percent in tire for the 
eight-cylinder car that 
occupied half of the car 
maker’s total sales 
Franklin 100 percent Stearns 0 percent (Miller 100 
percent) 
Gardner 100 percent Studebaker 0 percent (Firestone, US 
Rubber, Goodrich) 
Hudson & 75 percent (US Rubber 25 Stutz 0 percent (Lee and Goodrich 
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Essex percent) 100 percent) 
Hupp 100 percent Velie 0 percent (Miller 100 
percent) 
Jordan 0 percent (Lee 100 percent) Wills-St. 
Claire 
0 percent (Firestone had a 
substantial share) 
Hupp Approximately 75 percent 
(Firestone 25 percent) 
Willys-
Overland 
0 percent (Fisk 100 percent) 
Source: Sales Promotion Department of Goodyear, 1926, Sales Promotion Material. 
 
 
4. Intertwining of the market and organizational principles in tire transactions 
In the long-term transactions between Ford and Firestone, the market and organizational 
principles intertwined in several ways. First, the long-term transactions between the two 
firms were based on the intense competition among automobile companies and that 
among oligopolistic tire companies. In other words, market competition was intertwined 
with organizational transaction. Second, the beginning of in-house tire production by 
Ford illustrates the intermingling of the organizational and market principles. The firm 
started in-house tire production in the River Rouge Factory in 1938. Within a short 
period, the productivity of tire production increased to high levels, although Ford sold 
its tire business to Soviet Union in 1943. 20  The beginning of in-house production 
demonstrates the organizational principle since it is an organizational action. 
Simultaneously, it represents the market principle, as well, since one of the reasons why 
Ford started the in-house production of tires was its interest conflict with suppliers and 
the interest conflict between suppliers and customers illustrates the market principle. 
Moreover, by starting in-house production, Ford suddenly changed from being a 
customer to a competing tire firm,21 thereby promoting fierce competition in OE tire 
market. This case expresses the market principle. In addition, although it started the in-
house production of tires, Ford continued to purchase tires from other tire firms. 
Consequently, the in-house tire division had to compete against other tire firms. This 
phenomenon was very similar to the multi-sourcing policy since the competition among 
tire suppliers was beneficial to customers, which further revealed the market principle. 
Consequently, the in-house production of tires by Ford can be considered to express the 
intertwining of market and organizational principles. 
                                                 
20 Interview with E. F. Wait in 1954, 28-29, 37; French, 1989, 180; French, 1991, 59.  
21 Gaffey, 1940, 169; Interview with E. F. Wait in 1954, 27. 
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In the third example of the intermingling of the two principles, the multi-sourcing 
policy of tire production adopted by Ford, which represents the market principle, 
coexisted with Firestone’s construction of a factory to deliver tires exclusively to Ford, 
which represents the organizational principle. Finally, although automobile companies 
used the competition among tire companies by adopting the multi-sourcing policy while 
purchasing tires, there were only a small number of suppliers who delivered tires to 
automobile firms.  
 
5. Formation of a close relationship between General Motors and US Rubber: 
Manifestation of the Organizational Principle  
General Motors, which had a decentralized purchasing system comprising several 
divisions, had weak relationships with specific tire firms, unlike Ford and Chrysler.22 
Nonetheless, since the early 1930s, General Motors had been performing long-term 
continuous tire transactions with US Rubber. 
Until the 1920s, General Motors and US Rubber did not have a strong relationship in 
terms of tire transactions. In the 1910s, Goodyear was the main supplier of tires to 
General Motors23 and, as illustrated in Table 4, different divisions in General Motors 
had different suppliers. In addition, According to Table 3, US Rubber could not sell OE 
tires to the main divisions of General Motors, such as Chevrolet and Oakland. 
According to a former salesman of US Rubber, in 1930, US Rubber contracted with 
Ford for the sale of 700,000 sets of tires and, for several years, US Rubber supplied 
about 20 percent of the total number of tires required by Ford. The firm’s relationship 
with General Motors deteriorated in the late 1920s.24 
Nevertheless, in the early 1930s, US Rubber started its long-term transaction with 
General Motors. In March 1931, the two companies formally declared their long-term 
transaction contract. The first delivery of tires occurred in May 1932 and, in the same 
year, US Rubber supplied half the number of tires purchased by General Motors. In 
1933, US Rubber sold tires to 100 percent of luxury cars in the Cadillac Lasalle 
                                                 
22 Bobcock, 1966, 303. 
23 Blackford and Kerr, 1996, 93, 95; French, 1989, 180; French, 1991, 27; Jones, 1983, 
33.  
24 Bobcock, 1966, 305, 308. 
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Division.25 This transaction and the close interfirm relationship continued until 1942 
and, following World War II, the two firms restarted their long-term transaction. 
The long-term and close relationships maintained by the two companies in their 
transactions represent the organizational principle, although I could observe other 
organizational aspects, as well, in this relationship. First, with respect to price, General 
Motors set a “preliminary billing price” in its transaction with US Rubber and 
maintained this price a secret from other tire companies. The price was fixed after 
considering the estimated cost reduction by US Rubber and adding ‘proper profit’ to the 
estimated production cost; the price was regularly revised. 26  I infer that, in the 
transaction, the two companies practiced organizational price setting. 
Second, in 1931, US Rubber purchased a considerable number of the stocks of 
Gillette Safety Tire, which transacted OE tires with General Motors and was established 
in 1916 in Wisconsin. Further, in 1940, US Rubber bought all the stocks of Gillette 
Safety. Consequently, US Rubber increased the number of tires that were transacted 
with General Motors. By assuming the ownership of and performing mergers with other 
tire companies, US Rubber intentionally expanded the volume of its tire transaction 
with General Motors, which illustrates the organizational principle, as well. 
Third, the establishment of personal relations promoted the close relationships 
between the companies. An example is discussed as follows: Du Pont purchased 20 
percent of US Rubber’s stocks in 1928, based on its capital relations, he sent Francis 
David Jr., a top management personnel of General Motors, to US Rubber as the new 
chief executive officer. After this relocation, David Jr. managed to expand the tire 
orders from several divisions of General Motors by using the personal network that had 
been formed by him while working at General Motors. 27  Fourth, General Motors 
maintained close relationships with Firestone in not only tire transactions but also the 
procurement of rubbers. Hence, the two companies shared multifaceted organizational 
relationships. Specifically, General Motors used US Rubber’s purchasing department as 
its own ‘purchasing agent’ to procure crude rubber. Initially, General Motors requested 
US Rubber to buy some crude rubber on behalf of the former. Accordingly, US Rubber 
delivered the rubber to General Motors, following which General Motors distributed 
                                                 
25 Bobcock, 1966, 307. 
26 Bobcock, 1966, 306-307. 
27 Bobcock, 303, 306-307, 309; French, 1991, 59. 
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crude rubber back to US Rubber for tire production to satisfy the former’s demand. 
Moreover, the skilful management of inventory and procurement of crude rubber by US 
Rubber resulted in an increase in the volume of transactions between the two firms.28 
 
6. Market principle in the interfirm relationship between General Motors and US 
Rubber 
The market principle was observed to work in the transaction between General Motors 
and US Rubber. First, General Motors practiced the multi-sourcing policy in its 
purchase of tires. Table 2 clarifies that each division of General Motors practiced the 
same policy. Under the firm’s decentralized purchasing system, the purchasing 
department of each division carefully adjusted the numbers of tires purchased from each 
tire firm to utilize the competition among the tire firms.29 Even after General Motors 
had established long-term continuous transaction relations with US Rubber, it purchased 
tires from many other tire companies. This policy aimed at promoting competition 
among tire firms represents the market principle.  
Second, General Motors applied pressure on US Rubber to provide price cuts and 
low profit margins, which represents the working of the market principle in this case. 
Regardless of their long-term relationship, the price level requested by General Motors 
was extremely severe.30 Further, in 1933, a new provision on the delivery price of tires 
was added to the contract between General Motors and US Rubber. The provision 
required the delivery price of US Rubber tires to be below the price level at which the 
other big tire firms. 31  This provision severely limited US Rubber’s profit. This is 
particularly relevant since, in the 1930s, the OE tire business of most big tire firms had 
low profit rates.32 This phenomenon demonstrates the market principle. 
Third, the conflict between General Motors and US Rubber and change in bargaining 
power between them in terms of tire transactions represent the market principle. Since 
the interest of a customer varies from that of a supplier in terms of product price, quality, 
                                                 
28 Bobcock, 1966, 306; French, 1989, 183. 
29 Bobcock, 1966, 307. 
30 Nelson, 1988, 112; Rodengen, 1997, 91. 
31 Bobcock, 1966, 308; French, 1991, 59; Katz, 1977, 379. 
32 Allen, 1943, 353; French, 1991, 53; Gaffey, 1940, 133. 
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and delivery time, there occurred conflicts of interests between the two firms, which 
represent the market principle. Moreover, in the transaction, the bargaining process 
helped resolve the conflicts of interests and secure the interest of each party. This 
demonstrates the market principle. 
In this bargaining process of the tire transaction, there occurred a change in the 
relative power of the two firms, that is, the bargaining power of General Motors tended 
to increase compared to that of US Rubber. The first reason for this strengthening of 
General Motor’s bargaining power is that the concentration ratio of the U.S. automobile 
industry was larger than that of the U.S. tire industry at the time.33 The second reason is 
the size difference that existed between big automobile companies and big tire 
companies. Since General Motors had a higher bargaining power, US Rubber had to 
accept the former’s request for low tire delivery prices and many unfavourable 
transaction conditions.34 This represents the working of the market principle. 
Furthermore, the U.S. car market was mature and saturated in the late 1920s, and the 
Great Depression in the early 1930s had a significant negative effect on the demand for 
cars. Consequently, car production fluctuated sharply. General Motors was affected, and 
the company’s tire order volume and its transaction volume with US Rubber underwent 
violent fluctuations; however, the firms maintained their long-term transaction 
relationship. Since this violent fluctuation in transaction was significantly affected by 
market conditions, this phenomenon can be interpreted as representing the market 
principle. 
I observe that the amount of transaction between General Motors and big tire 
companies sharply fluctuated in the late 1910s and the 1920s. For instance, according to 
Table 5, General Motors rapidly decreased its purchase of tires from Goodyear from late 
1918 to 1921. Further, the ratio of tire sales to Goodyear’s production for General 
Motors declined sharply (Table 5), which illustrates that predicting the quantity of 
transaction with General Motors was difficult during the recession period in early 1920. 
In general, the demand for OE tires fluctuated more sharply than the total tire 
demand prior to World War II. For instance, according to Figure 1, the OE tire demand 
of Goodyear varied more significantly than the total demand for tires in the 1930s. 
 
                                                 
33 Bobcock, 1966, 213; French, 1991, 30, 53. 
34 French, 1991, 28. 
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Table 5 – Sales to General Motors and production for General Motors in Goodyear  
Unit: Set, percent 
  Sales to General 
Motors(A) 
Production for 
General Motors(B) 
(B)÷(A)×100 
July 1, 1916–June 30, 
1917 
275,567 260,322 94.5 
July 1, 1917–June 30, 
1918 
292,952 250,278 85.4 
July 1, 1918–June 30, 
1919 
256,538 231,850 90.4 
July 1, 1919–June 30, 
1920 
390,521 385,102 98.6 
July 1, 1920–June 30, 
1921 
211,455 129,155 61.1 
July 1, 1921–Dec. 31, 
1921 
116,439 60,727 52.2 
Jan. 1, 1922–Dec. 31. 
1922 
444,367 250,576 56.4 
Jan. 1, 1923–Dec. 31. 
1923 
763,921 286,926 37.6 
Source: Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company Records, 1898–1933. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Change rates of the sales of all tires and OE tires for Goodyear; OE, 
original equipment 
Unit: Percent 
Source: Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company Records, 1898–1933. 
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Since the tire industry is highly capital intensive, it is very important that tire 
companies maintain the operation rate of tire production to meet sharp fluctuations in 
demand. Consequently, tire makers sell their tires at low prices and with low profit rates 
to acquire stable orders. These phenomena clearly demonstrate the sensitivity of price 
and profit rate to demand and supply in the market and, thereby, represent the working 
of the market principle. 
 
7. Intertwining of market and organizational principles in the interfirm 
relationship between General Motors and US Rubber 
In tire transactions between General Motors and US Rubber, the market and 
organizational principles are intertwined in different ways. At the time of establishing a 
transaction relationship, interfirm cooperation is essential since conflicts of interests 
occur between the participating firms and each insists on furthering its own interest. 
Second, General Motors exerted pressure on US rubber to reduce the price of tire supply, 
while the former considered setting the price to ensure the ‘proper’ production cost and 
‘proper’ margins of US Rubber. Third, General Motors combined its long-term 
transaction relationship with the multi-sourcing policy in its purchase of tires to utilize 
the competition among tire firms. Moreover, while adopting this multi-sourcing policy, 
General Motors carefully adjusted the purchasing shares of tire firms. Finally, although 
it had close relationship with US Rubber in terms of tire transactions, General Motors 
sought competing bids that were open to many other tire companies to purchase more 
than half of its requirement for tires. In these bids, tire firms suggested low prices to 
General Motors.35 
 
Conclusions 
Before World War II, the organizational principle strongly affected the tire transactions 
between big automakers and big tire manufacturers in the U.S. tire industry in the way 
of long-term contracts. Further, in transactions between big automobile firms and tire 
firms, personnel relationships and networks, including the relocation of personnel both in firms 
and between firms, were important aspects illustrating the organizational principle. 
                                                 
35 Sobel, 1953, 13. 
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On the other hand, the transactions on a negotiation basis were significantly affected 
by market forces and market principles. First, even in long-term transactions, there were 
conflicts of interests between automobile companies and tire companies. In tire 
transactions between big automobile firms and big tire firms, the bargaining power of 
the former was stronger. These conflicts of interests and changes in bargaining power 
represent the working of the market principle. Second, customers exerted pressure on 
tire firms to reduce the cost of tires, which resulted in a low margin rate of tire 
production and even unprofitability. Furthermore, OE tires underwent wide fluctuations 
in demand so that, to maintain high operation rates, tire firms tended to competitively 
offer price cuts. Since the bargaining power of them tended to be weaker than that of 
automobile firms in interfirm transactions, the former often yielded to the pressure 
exerted by the latter in reducing prices. These phenomena illustrate the working of the 
market principle. Third, the competition among tire firms created by the customer’s 
adoption of the multi-sourcing policy in their purchase of tires interacted with the low 
price and low profitability.  
Meanwhile, the transactions between Ford and Firestone and those between General 
Motors and US Rubber revealed the intertwining of the organizational and market 
principles. Long-term transactions of tires were maintained based on the intense 
competition among not only automobile companies but also oligopolistic tire companies. 
In other words, these transactions represented a combination of market competition and 
organizational transaction. Second, although long-term relationships existed between 
customers and suppliers in many cases, conflicts of interests and variations in 
bargaining power occurred in the OE tire transactions. Third, when big automobile 
companies practiced the multi-sourcing policy in their tire purchases, they intentionally 
adjusted the purchasing proportions of automobile companies to prevent extensive 
changes in the suppliers’ market shares. Fourth, pressure to enable price cutting was 
combined with price setting to ensure proper production cost and the proper margins of 
suppliers. Finally, the beginning of in-house tire production by Ford illustrates the 
intermingling of the organizational and market principles.  
This paper will provide the important clues to international comparative analysis on 
interfirm relationship, which can contribute to accumulation of studies in the area of 
business history. 
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